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 Culture, society and development are the three most pertinent factors 
associated with every human civilization; however, they are distinctive and 
relative. Thus, development exists distinctively in every society. Today, 
globalization has promoted and consolidated democracy – ‘liberal democracy’ – 
almost across the globe as the single ideology and the best form of government 
that must be practised for the protection of individuals’ fundamental human 
rights. However, the adoption of liberal democracy varies and continues to 
create a dichotomous marginality between the ‘capitalist West’ and the so-
called developing nations with respect to its results. The pertinent questions 
are: what is the relevance of liberal democracy to Third World development? 
How important are the desirability, feasibility, conditions and possibilities of 
liberal democracy for a country where democracy is alien to its political 
culture? And how is the cultural and historical backdrop of the developing 
world different from that of the West? We will explore the importance of 
political clientelism in African political development and look beyond liberal 
democracy for an African-like democracy. This essay aims to contribute to our 
collaborative intellectual efforts by looking at the existence of development in 
human cultural patterns, the historical perspective of liberal democracy, its 
meaning, its validity, its relationship to African development, neo-colonialism 
and the global clientelistic structure for continuous dependency, as well as 
political clientelism importance to African development; by reconstructing the 
ontological notion of development to the Third World nations as envelopment- 
overt control of the progress of Third World nations by Global West and by 
suggesting a possible alternative for a sustainable development.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Africa suffered great economic and political losses under the exploitative and brutal manifestations 
of colonial rule. This destruction was so intense that after colonial rule the continent was in no 
position to develop itself without foreign assistance. A further reflection of this is the importation of 
the liberal democratic system of government. Liberal democracy as a system of government may be 
defined in a minimal and procedural fashion as a political system where multiple political parties are 
in competition to take control of the government by contesting in free and fair elections (Foweraker 
and Krznaric 1999). 
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The ideological and philosophical makeup of liberal democracy hails from Western thought, and 
liberal democracy has been seen as the only, irrefutably good form of government. Many countries 
around the world are undergoing “democratization:” indeed, some are compelled to adopt it by the 
emergence of the “good governance” agendas of international institutions such as the World Bank. 
International organizations and states are intruding on other states’ sovereignty in various and bold 
ways for the sake of promoting democracy and freedom. They even want democracy to be recognized 
as a fundamental human right. 
This is as a result of their intention to consolidate and promote their capitalist system across 
Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, the pattern 
of democratic expansion and improved well-being holds for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
African nation-states consists of multilingual and multiethnic units in which cultural practices 
and heritages are seen to be distinct and unique. Many African societies practice political clientelism 
because it can be traced to their social system, heritage, social thought and belief systems. Clientelism 
is a kind of social relationship whereby the additional privileged people (patrons) exchange 
merchandise for the loyalty of less privileged people (clients; Joseph 1991; Taylor 2004, Garcia-
Guadilla and Perez 2002). Political clientelism is essential in African society because it is a system in 
which the loyalty of the people is domiciled in traditional rulers and religious leaders rather than 
elected leaders. 
Consequently, liberal democracy and political clientelism have not taken African nations, 
including Nigeria, anywhere. This is as a result of the continuous influence of neocolonialism, which 
causes the loss of internal control among developing nations. This effective loss of internal economic 
control has occurred while many developing nations have embraced democracy is deeply ironic and 
carries with it potentially explosive political consequences. Among these consequences are the surge 
of ethnic hatred, competition, ethnic favouritism and nepotism that are visible in African democratic 
nations. 
Liberal delegative democracy operates as an ambulant monarchy that periodically mobilizes 
people to choose their new ruler, hijacking and kidnapping society and its resources in the process. 
No matter its avowed ideology, creed and, occasionally, good intentions, it tends to derail into 
oligarchy-like structures. Michels’ (1911) “iron law of oligarchy” is perfectly valid, but only so in the 
case of delegation, not of representation. 
Appropriation of power by elites only creates social and political disasters in national policy and 
at the global level as well as harbours polarization and extreme violence. Globalization, appropriation 
of power and inter-elite confrontation are contrary to the genuine interests of the people of the 
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world (Sankatsing 2004). This can be seen in  the current insurgency experienced in Nigeria, in which 
Boko Haram continues to terrorize the nation on both political and religious matters with the 
ultimate goal of causing a political disaster for the present government. 
The West has continued what they called development politics for the ex-colonies, based on 
their intention to secure the control of resources, economies and politics of the ex-colonies (Monar 
2000:  119). Development politics, as it was introduced by the colonial masters during the formation 
of the EC, was intended to make good on the destruction that Europe had caused in Africa through 
colonialism. Development aid thus started as a mechanism to provide help to develop the new 
nations. 
Madubuike (2000) emphasized that, in the light of current development, it is urgent to pose the 
question: what sort of democracy is desirable for Africa? Is it the one bound to the dictates of West? 
When are we going to determine how much our raw materials are worth to our prospective buyers? 
Is it still possible to go back to our cultural values as a people, without the colonial mentality of 
wholesale Western norms? 
With social forces and the struggle for survival continuously on the scene, the vital issues are 
inspiring individuals to pursue self-fulfilment and increasing awareness wherever the deepest secret 
of political modification is found. The conviction that real options to take command of the own 
destiny are available, or can be brought within reach, is the key to liberate people from adulterating 
discourses and from induced consent. A sensible definition of awareness is, therefore, necessary for 
examining an alternative to the existing reality. 
 
2. Democracy, its origin, meaning and validity 
One basic shortcoming created by the elastic use of the construct of democracy is the problem of its 
definition (Falaye 1998: 97). As one scholar wrote, “the promotion, practice and vicissitudes of 
democracy in different parts of the world have exposed it to some definitional haze and diverse forms 
of interpretations (Adediran 1996: 47). Therefore, it is not an issue of surprise that by the word 
“democracy”, many scholars could have cardinal divergent opinions. Two reasons advanced for this 
by K. A. Owolabi is that initial “democracy” has become in current usage, another word for political 
decency and civilisation” (Owolabi 1999: 5). 
Democracy is derived from two Greek words: δῆμος and κρατία, meaning people and rule, 
respectively. The combination of both phrases has been translated to literally mean ‘rule by the 
people’. Perhaps, this explains why Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as the “government of the 
people and for the people”. 
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In ancient Athens, democracy was used to describe a practice in which all male citizens 
(therefore to the exclusion of women, children, slaves and foreigners) met freely on a regular basis to 
deliberate on issues impacting their lives. Everybody was playing the role of government by creating 
rules and regulations and running an orderly society. Direct democracy was made easier because the 
population was not too large for the convenience of such practice. However, we must understand 
that the economic systems of slavery and feudalism served as a catalyst to the success of direct 
democracy because the slave owners had ample time to partake in government business. 
In a nutshell, etymologically, democracy does not stand for ‘rule of the people’, but for ‘power of 
the people’ because δῆμος means ‘people’ and κρατία means ‘power’ (the emphasis on power is also 
found in aristocracy, plutocracy, meritocracy, and theocracy). Rule is expressed by the suffix ‘-archy,’ 
such as monarchy (one ruler), anarchy (no ruler), oligarchy (family or small group rules) and 
hierarchy (structure of rule). Therefore, what is needed is a democracy that has evolved into 
‘demoarchy,’ not just the power to elect, but rather the power to rule should be in the hands of the 
people, not delegation but representation.  
 
3. Liberal democracy 
In discussing the concept of liberal democracy, it is pertinent to start by separating liberalism from 
democracy, to trace and scrutinize their historical contexts in order to facilitate a clear meaning and 
understanding of the concepts. Liberal and democratic principles dominate contemporary political 
thought. The primary principle is that selection rests with the individual and not with society. The 
second principle attributes the ability of making decisions to the ‘majority’ (Samet and Schmeidler 
2002). As its commonn etymological derivation suggests, the most basic meaning of the word 
“democracy” is the rule of the people. As the rule of the many, it is distinguished from monarchy (the 
rule of one person), aristocracy (the rule of the best), and oligarchy (the rule of the few). The word 
“liberal” on the other hand in the phrase ‘liberal democracy’ refers not to the matter of who rules, 
but to the matter of how that rule is exercised. 
Liberalism and democracy are not necessarily compatible. While one emphasizes the resolution 
of disagreement by debate where ideally everyone is convinced and won over, the other resolves it by 
vote where some are silenced. 
There are many other definitions that can validate this claim. Liberal democratic government 
may be defined in a minimal and procedural fashion as a political system where multiple political 
parties compete for control of the government through relatively free and fair elections (Foweraker 
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and Krznaric, 2000). However, beyond this minimum benchmark, it is recognized that liberal 
democratic performance in such political systems varies widely. 
Liberal democracy, whether in theory or practice, seems to be a socio-political formation, which 
embodies two different tensions: 
First, democracy can be seen as a principle of popular rule and popular control of decision-
making. We can consider the principle of private property rights in the means of production on the 
one hand and distribution and exchange on the other. This tension can be expressed in many 
different ways. The idea of equal citizenship is embedded within the notion of popular rule is 
restricted by the relationships that control and subordinate possession rights within the sphere of 
production, and by the unequal weight of the guarantees to a minority within the sphere of politics. 
The range of popular government is limited by the resource allocation and distributive functions of 
the market, whether it is conceived in its classical or oligopolistic form. 
Second, liberal democracy is a more specifically political term between democracy as a principle 
of popular control of decision-making, and a conception of representation that assigns the 
representative a competence to decide public issues according to his or her own conception of the 
public good. This competence goes beyond the reciprocal influence between leaders and leads to a 
concern with protecting the positions and prerogatives of the representative against encroachments 
from below. The elected representative thus embodies essential elements of the liberal ideal of the 
independent individual, capable of freely assuming responsibility for his or her decisions (Beetham 
1992). 
Liberal democracy is debatable as a mode of legitimate endorsement of power. The ‘electorate’ is 
not the equivalent of the ‘people’, and it does not even represent any meaningful social force or social 
group. The electorate is an amorphous mixture of people, delinked from social ties, social contexts 
and social networks, and it lacks any meaningful existence outside the ballot. It is best then to 
categorize the electorate not as a social grouping, but as a political construct. 
In practical politics, a complicated network of political leaders, intermediary organizations, key 
persons and opinion-making institutions rearranges pre-existing social, economic, cultural, religious 
and ethnic power structures into bargained legal authorities. This method endows vested interests, 
economic elites and dominating powers with ample space to translate their fractional influences in 
society into concerted efforts to control the monopoly of power by the state (Sankatsing 2004). 
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4. Africa and liberal democracy 
It is important to note that the spread of liberal democracy did not just occur “naturally” or 
“inevitably,” but it resulted from deliberate steps taken by the victors in World War II that not only 
governed and stimulated international economic relations but also regulated the internal matters “of 
the world’s nation-states.” Before the advent of colonialism, most African systems of government 
were not democratic in any modern sense. Gregory Mahler (1995) clearly explained African situation: 
he wrote that Africa is a large region of over fifty independent states with diverse political 
institutions, political histories, political culture and customs; yet, in spite of these differences, there 
are features the states have in common that affect them politically.  
Most African countries were colonized and later gained independence from colonial powers. The 
political culture in most of the states is heterogeneous due to the various traditional ethnic groups 
and tribes within these states. Gregory further explains that elections and democratic politics in 
Africa have common histories because of how the countries were politically organized by their 
colonial masters. For instance, in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra-Leone and the Gambia, Africans were elected 
into legislative councils in the 1920s. After independence, the success and importance of elections in 
African countries became bleak and doubtful. “Elections in much of contemporary African countries 
were widely regarded as irrelevant or a sham. There was growing evidence of elections which did not 
reflect democratic values that those responsible followed neither the electoral procedure set out in 
the institutions bequeathed at independence nor other requirements of free and fair competition” 
(Mahler 1995: 357). 
 To differentiate the term African democracy from liberal democracy as used in this research, it 
is important to analyse the thinking of African leaders of post-independent Africa. According to 
Ahluwalia (2007), all the African leaders of post-independence Africa, such as Nyerere in Tanzania, 
Nkrumah in Ghana, and Kenyatta in Kenya, dismissed multiparty democracy, a fundamental principle 
of liberal democracy, as not being congruent with their African traditions. They argued that a system 
of one-party government was African and an essential part of the African tradition. Therefore, 
according to their definitions, African democracy is a form of government based on one-party rule. 
Political parties may exist nominally, but they may not freely organize political activities in 
opposition to the rulers and the ruling party.  
Another description of African democracy put forward by African leaders after African 
independence is based on their argument that traditional African societies rested on a politics of 
consensus, not of competition – a principle they professed to be promoted by proponents of 
multiparty democracy. In the post-colonial era, the problem with this concurrence under this so-
Kervan – International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies n. 23/2 (2019) 
 
103 
 
called African democracy in terms of democratic governance is that it functioned primarily between 
the monarch and his/her retinue (mainly relatives of the monarchs, such as uncles and in-laws) and 
the ruling elites. The ordinary voters were rarely consulted. Their role was to adapt, not challenge, 
the commands of the ruling elites. In this scenario, the powers of the three branches of government, 
ordinarily separated in Western democratic states, are concentrated in one man (or woman) at the 
helm of government in a form of African democracy. According to Staffan Lindberg (2004), the 1950s 
was the initial period for Africa’s first wave of democracy. This was the time Africans were struggling 
to gain independence from their colonial masters. Because African countries were still under their 
colonial powers, restrictions were imposed on them. In the Francophone countries there were limited 
electoral roles for Africans, while elections were restricted to the local government in Anglophone 
countries (Lindberg 2004). 
Fayemi (2009) noted that democarcy is embedded within political culture of traditional Africa 
society. This he noted can be found in the mode of goverance in Bostwana. To justify his position, he 
gave an historical analysis of the Yoruba (a major ethnic group in Nigeria) political culture before 
colonialism. He argued that the system of governance in the Yoruba poilitcal cultue is a balance of 
“monarchy and democracy”. Pre-colonial Yoruba  political system comprised of metropolitan cities 
headed by the OBA- traditional ruler or monarch, subordinate viilages and towns ruled by BAALE or 
OLORI ILU (Head of the village or town) subsivient to the Oba. Each town is subdivided into quarters 
headed by a chief and quarters divided into compounds or extended families  joined together by 
descendants from an ancestor headed by OLORI EBI (Family Head). Decisons taken at the various levels 
of governance is done by consensus and particpatory democracy. Before vital decisons are taken at 
the compound level, all members of the family must be involved in the decison making process. 
Particpation is regarded asa duty for all members, any who refuse to particpate may face ostractism. 
Decison making process is done the same at the quarters and village or town levels. At the 
metroplitan city, the Oba must consult the chiefs, the cult and sect priests and representatives of vital 
sections of the populace such as traders, guild of hunters, army etc before making vital decisons.  
Leadership is not hereditary- from father to son at any of these levels. The BAALE OR OLORI EBI is 
selected uniamously based on age and prominence. The quarter chiefs are selected amidst the leading 
family investing with the title and presented for approval to the members of the quarters and then to 
the BAALE or OBA for investiture. The OBA is selected amidst the families that consitute the royal 
clan and every male member is eligible for the position. The power to select the new OBA is given to a 
standing council of chiefs called – AFOBAJE (the KINGMAKERS) in consultation with the IFA oracle. 
Before the new OBA is selected, there are laid down rules and regulations that must be followed- the 
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eligible candidtates are investigated for their moral disposition, leadership styles and skills and 
personality traits. The consensus of the general populace concerning the candidates are gotten by the 
the Kingmakers before final selection and the spiritual guidance of the oracle is sought. The new king 
upon installation is informed that his government is based on the decisions of his subjects. The 
people have the right to express their opinions about their leaders directly or through other means. 
The king is not expected to be autocractic since there are several checks and balances curtailing the 
excesses of any autocractic king. Yoruba history is repleted with histories of autocratic kings and how 
they were rejected and forcibly removed by their subjects. 
 
5. African democracy and political clientelism 
The literature is fertile with definitions of clientelism. Some definitions tend to associate the 
phenomenon with democracy or democratization. Kitschelt (2008) refers to clientelism as a particular 
mode of principal-agent relationship in democracies. Clientelism, for several authors, is one of many 
historical forms in which interests are represented and promoted in political society. It is “a practical 
(although in many ways undesirable) resolution to the matter of democratic representation” 
(Roniger 2004: 360). 
A recent survey of political clientelism by Susan Stoke was based primarily on European and 
recent Latin American political science literature and barely mentioned are the African literature or 
the anthropological and sociological sources that have been so influential for understanding of the 
concept in the low-income world. Focusing on the impact of formal electoral rules on these practices, 
Stokes defined clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support” 
(Stokes 2008). 
Irrespective of the varied positions of scholars on patronage, an inherent component of 
patronage is an inbuilt relationship of power between patrons and clients. Of course, it is 
straightforward to assume that the patron should have a monopoly of power, since he is the one who 
provides material resources. It is however necessary to note that clients too exercise an enormous 
amount of power in the exchange relationship through the non-material resources they control. 
Indeed, the patron may control power over state and productive resources, but he requires the 
loyalty of clients to sustain it (Omobowale 2008). 
Omobowale (2008) carried out a study on the values and meanings connected to patron-client 
relationships in Yoruba social thought looking at proverbs that relate to these relationships. The 
proverbs address the positive values the baba-Isale as patron is expected to portray in order to secure 
the loyalty of the client. Indeed, aside from providing goods, the patron is expected to be exemplar in 
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his character, all of which is embedded in the social values of Iwa, Ihuwasi, Isesi and Ajumose. Once a 
patron has internalized these ideals, which are relevant to the sustenance of the social structure, he 
would be recognized as an omoluabi and the services he extends to the clients would be significant. 
This study shows a cordial communal relationship among the Yoruba social group (Omobowale 2008). 
A similar structure exists among the Hausa: taking the Sokoto caliphate as an example, its 
administrative system was largely organized around a number of largely independent emirates 
pledging allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto. The Hausa kingdoms prior to the caliphate were run 
largely through hereditary succession for leadership.  
Omobowale’s study on the Ibadan further explains the clientelistic relationship among the social 
groups. His work clearly explains the perception of people that Ibadan men must be appointed at 
federal and state administrative levels to represent and protect Ibadan interests. More often than 
not, officials are selected for positions based on the recommendation of patrons. Of course, such 
officials are expected to be loyal to the patrons who recommended them, while also extending goods 
to clients through the patronage/clientelistic system that ensured their appointment (see also 
Omobowale 2008; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Omobowale 2006; Olurode 1986). He further 
emphasized in his work that clientelism is unique because it shows that clients do not operate as lone 
individuals but as members of associations that are deliberately created in order to have more clout 
with patrons; he emphasized that aggrieved clients, in addition, can exert leverage by changing, or 
threatening to change, their patrons. A patron is appointed on the basis of his financial strength and 
good character as exemplified in his philanthropic deeds and wisdom: “the appointment of a patron 
starts from money and then good character” (Omobowale 2008). 
Omobowale concluded that it is important to admit that associations are pivotal to clientelistic 
structures. Clients do not relate to patrons as individual adherents, but they rather form social and 
welfare associations in order to increase their clout with prospective patrons. These associations 
subsequently become essential to the clientelistic system through the attraction of goods in exchange 
for loyalty. Indeed, once association members yield their support to particular patrons and 
politicians, they informally campaign and solicit the support of friends, family members and other 
close associates for a particular politician or party during election periods. This network of 
associational clients, patrons and politicians goes a long way towards determining who gets power 
and who retains power (Omobowale 2008). 
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6. Neo-colonialism: democratic hegemony and global clientelistic relationship 
After political independence, many African leaders were perplexed to find that the economic, 
political and cultural exploitation of the continent actually continued in what became known as 
“neocolonialism” (Mwaura 2005: 5). Neocolonialism operated in varying ways in post-colonial Africa: 
control over government in the neocolonial state through foreign financial support or through the 
presence of foreign consortia serving and upholding foreign financial interests. Whichever way one 
analyses it, neocolonialism resulted in the exploitation of the African states, such that foreign capital 
entering African states to foster development “promoted” instead underdevelopment (Nkrumah 
1975: 415). In some cases, neocolonialism has gone as far as using troops from colonizing nations to 
control or support the government of the neocolonial state. For example, French troops remained 
present and active in French colonies long after independence: in May 1996, French soldiers 
supporting the CAR government fired at national soldiers who were angry at their government for 
failing to pay their salaries (New York Times, 24/05/1996). 
Kolawole Owolabi discussed extensively on the democratic hegemony the West left for Africa 
nations as a legacy. He asserted that “having realized that the days of colonization were numbered, 
the West discovered that it could not survive without exploiting the resources of the third world 
countries. One way by which the West can successfully realize this goal is to step up its cultural 
Imperialism and promote its democratic culture as the ideal culture” (Owolabi 1994: 115). 
Neocolonialism survived because the West established a dependent economic and political structure 
on the continent, which was inherited and retained by the new leaders. These “ambassadors” of the 
colonizers, as N. Mwuara (2000: 6) describes them, promoted foreign interests over domestic 
interests, maintaining the economic and political structures of the colonizers. They got involved in 
“brainwashing” their followers to support and uphold neocolonialism. The mass brainwashing of 
post-colonial rulers and their successors resulted in sustained neocolonialism to the detriment and 
underdevelopment of Africa. Deji Odetoyinbo (1994) chooses to describe the instilling of the 
neocolonial political culture in African leaders as “brain-dirtying”. According to Odetoyinbo, 
brainwashing forces the understanding of “cleaning or make pure” in one’s mind, which is far from 
being the case with neocolonialism. As a result, the minds of Africans “have been deeply and 
thoroughly sullied by our contact with Europeans” – Odetoyinbo continues - including all “contacts, 
past and present, wilful and enforced, intimate and casual, malicious and well intentioned”. 
(Odetoyinbo 1994). 
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7. The core question: can Africa develop? 
7.1. Breaking the hegemony 
As illustrated above, democracy as a modern style of governance was not born in Africa. The 
literature shows that in the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank used a number of measures, such as 
financial aid and economic sanctions, to try to force many African countries into adopting a form of 
liberal democracy. According to Pausewang et al., “today Europe is the driving force in spreading 
democracy in Africa”. 
The most pertinent question is: are Africans doomed forever to be dependent on the West? Can’t 
we rethink our persistent dependence on the West? Uroh (1998) argued that “by implication, Africa 
may not be able to develop beyond the stage dictated by the west”. 
Anthonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be used to explain the situation: it refers to social 
situation in which a certain social group or an alliance of social groups has “a total social control or 
authority” over other social groups, not as a result of direct imposition of ruling ideas, but by 
winning and shaping consent, so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and 
natural. 
Hegemony and discourse are vital concepts for understanding the processes of awareness 
among social forces. A notable effort to overcome the constraints of economic reductionism within 
the Marxist tradition is Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which highlights the role of non-
economic factors. Hegemony is the influence exercised by enhancing legitimacy in society, while 
domination is exercised through control of the state. Hegemony “can be understood as the degree to 
which a combination of coercion and consent establishes authority and leadership without a direct 
resort to visible force or violence. It does not draw on naked power but on the awe towards power; 
therefore, the contribution of ‘power’ to ‘hegemony’ does not lie in its application but rather in the 
persuasive capacity of power as a potential and latent entity without the need to resort to direct 
force or violence” (Gramsci 1995: 57). 
Hegemony is typically supported by discourses that justify narrations presented as self-evident 
truths to mitigate the perception of reality. Their prime function is to prevent people and social 
forces from becoming aware of their real conditions and development options. Once social forces 
become conscious of their own reality and of their capacity to act, conditions are ready for them to 
design viable channels for collective survival, starting with the pursuit of interests and objectives 
that are critical for the own group.  
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7.2. The need for social change and class consciousness 
The most important single factor for triggering social change is awareness, defined as the sight of an 
alternative to existing reality. Two widely accepted tenacious myths surround the concept among 
social scientists and social reformers. The first is the tenet that the level of awareness and eagerness 
to take corrective action bears a causal relationship with the degree of pauperization, similar to 
Marx’s Verelendungstheorie. Second, it is believed that change in awareness is impossible on short 
notice, as changing the mentality of people requires huge efforts during an extended length of time, 
sometimes even generations. By inference, structural social and political change becomes utopian. 
The history of Caribbean slavery demystifies this defeatist tenet that only serves the status quo and 
the vague concept of mentality, which nobody cares to define with precision. 
However, class consciousness, according to Marx, is the transition from a ‘class in itself’ (a 
category of people having a common relation to the means of production) to a ‘class for itself’ (a 
stratum organized in active pursuit of its own interests). History dramatically shows that one can 
only dominate people by controlling their minds, thoughts and consciousnesses. It also provides the 
valuable lessons that, under the weight of harsh reality, avenues exist to trigger awareness on short 
notice. Accumulated frustration and hopelessness alone are not enough, but there comes a point that 
naked reality can overwhelm the strongest discourse. The time is then ripe for the minds and 
energies of people to be liberated by watching the conditions of their own reality, unmitigated by 
false narration. Evidence turned into action always triggers the motor of history. 
 
8. Interrogating concepts: development vs. envelopment 
All development theories of the last fifty years have failed, without exception. Worldwide, ambitious 
development initiatives derailed into deep crisis, casting the majority of humanity, living in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, into deep trouble and grave sorrow for the future. These 
failures, both in theory and in praxis, had one indisputable historical cause.  
The empire that does not claim to bring civilization has yet to be born. By deduction, the other is 
the barbarian. What was labelled ‘development’ was, in reality, the very opposite, ‘envelopment’, a 
paternalist process to incorporate the other, to overwhelm, to enclose and wrap up by envelopment, 
as done with an envelope. Annexation, insertion and incorporation into an alien genealogy and 
teleology were the goal, rather than supporting the growth of inner forces and allowing them to 
flourish from within the society. In the false development/underdevelopment dichotomy, the 
transfer and mimicry of devices from abroad were taken as the prime agents of progress, in an 
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imperial attempt of projecting oneself onto other societies, instead of mobilizing the inner forces of 
communities. The correct definition of development is the mobilization of the potentialities and 
social forces in a project of self-realization, in interactive response to nature, habitat, resources, 
culture and history for the realization of a project of one’s own. Development is a process from within 
that can trigger, support and sustain but can never donate by transfer, not even as a generous gift. 
This unmasking of the false development discourse has led to a new promising explanatory model, 
the development/envelopment paradigm, with development as self-realization and its negation, 
envelopment, as the incorporation of subdued people in a project that is alien to their internal social 
dynamism. 
By merging the development/envelopment paradigm with the social-reality-based 
extradisciplinary method, a powerful practical tool becomes available to formulate democratic 
alternatives in the realm of politics. The extradisciplinary approach eliminates the dichotomy 
between theory and praxis by putting an end to the inverted logic of current social sciences that the 
analysis of academia determines how society is analysed. This reality-based de-academization of 
social science rejects autonomous social science disciplines and overcomes the gulf between theory 
and practice inherent in the academic tradition. Complex social reality and history demand 
specializations for purposes of study rather than autonomous disciplines derived from academia, but 
always with the compelling requirement to put bits together before making any final statement. 
Social reality, rather than fragmentation in disciplines, becomes both the starting place and the end 
of the scientific enterprise in the extradisciplinary approach.  
With the development/envelopment paradigm, the nature of the alternatives of delegation and 
representation can be elaborated, since delegation is based on envelopment, while representation is 
an outcome of development.  
Development, based on this new paradigm, immediately poses the critical issue to the political 
realm of how the free individual voice can help secure both its self-realization and the collective 
destiny in a future-directed, development-oriented politics. Development, democracy and 
representation go hand in hand. Only in their close conjunction, a genuine project of society is 
possible under the command of social forces as the architects of history. Only people jointly 
determining the path to mobilize their own potentialities can control their own destiny by taking 
their concerns, needs and aspirations as the focal point. 
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9. Recommendations and possible alternatives to liberal democracy 
In history, alternatives are not found in encyclopaedias or the Internet but are constructed as a wilful 
act of conscious future-oriented people. Alternatives are always created in real life on roads heading 
to a future. Establishment of a synthetic democratic structure would be considered necessary. 
Development-based representation as the alternative to delegation is also the only escape route from 
social death and can promote development. Instead of people with muted voices, representation 
turns them into their own ombudsmen. At the same time, it opens the difficult but promising avenue 
to global harmony. An alternative democratic structure will ensure that rights of citizens are 
respected and kept. Citizens or groups in the society who are socially excluded will be given 
opportunity to be adequately represented.  The new form of democracy will be one that takes into 
consideration the culture, beliefs, history and ideaology of the people in the different African 
countries. This will form the basis of a new model for development in Africa. 
 
9.1. Establishment of a democratic structure that supports the Afrian project 
For example, the United States and Canada drew a protectionist wedge against Japan’s cheap 
industrial products, and Japan’s foreign investments were restricted. However, in spite of these acts 
of discrimination by the West, and consequent economic depression back home, the Japanese were 
determined to build a “self-sufficient empire”. They formulated policies that drive their political, 
cultural and diplomatic relationships (Madubike 2000). In this sense, Africa must develop its 
democracy in the traditional sense because the importance of traditional ruling system cannot be 
taken away from African society. Africans must develop immunity to foreign influences and structure 
their own political goals. Taking Japan, Germany and China as examples, whatever form of foreign 
influences they might have been exposed to at various points in their respective histories, they built 
their indigenous political systems without support from external factors. This form of democractic 
structure should take into comsideration the existence of cultural diversity and plurarity in the 
society and ensure equality of citizens and in their involvement in governance, this is the best the 
system to ensure development.  
 
9.2. Democratizing political clientelism 
It is pertinent to note that democratization has changed some of the key socio-political 
characteristics present in Africa while leaving others unchanged. Therefore, political clientelism will 
not disappear, but it will change in form and function as a result of these changes. However, Africa 
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has been characterized by unusually high levels of social inequality (van de Walle 2009). This seems 
inevitable, as the region’s political and economic institutions have generated social and economic 
stratification.  
Taking the Oyo state in Nigeria as an example, the Alafin (king or traditional ruler) claims that 
he is responsible for the installation of any political leader who will govern the state. This simply 
means that the power of traditional system and ruler can never be removed from Nigerian political 
culture. The people tend to be more loyal to their patron because they believe that they are closer to 
their patron than a political delegate as designed by liberal democracy. This is still evidenced in the 
current administration of Governor Abiola Ajimobi, whose administration seems unfavourable to the 
Oyo people despite visible infrastructural provisions.  
 
10. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to look beyond the present democratic structure of liberal democracy. 
However, democracy and development should now be perceived in the African context. Having seen 
the importance of cultural development in every society, the historical background of liberal 
democracy, its etymological meaning, context and influences in our contemporary world, it is 
pertinent to assert that the so-called Third World nations should structure their democratic systems 
and developmental affairs without the influence of the West. Because liberal democracy received the 
benefit of the doubt for so many years, the Third World nations have more doubts about the benefits 
of development. 
Our attention should be diverted away from delegation as it is practised in liberal democracies in 
which the traditional beneficiaries of the system are not the actors most inclined to modify it 
structurally. Rather than changing the rules of the game, what is at stake is changing the game itself 
in order to allow people to take command of their own destinies at a time when the stakes are high. 
Representative democracy is the only viable road left open to pursue global harmony by providing 
the minimum conditions to overcome three imminent threats, the collision in development, the 
collapse of ecology and the confrontation in religion, every single one of which directly endanger the 
survival of humanity. For most contenders in liberal democracy, corruption is not an excess of 
democracy, but the premium of democracy. Democratization of political clientelism is also pertinent 
so that the exchange relationship is visible between the political patrons and their clients in order to 
promote economic and social development. Since they are rational and tend to be calculative, the 
give-and-take principle will promote long-standing relationships in the political system. 
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